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HOW PATENT DAMAGES SKEW LICENSING MARKETS∗
Erik Hovenkamp†
Jonathan Masur††
ABSTRACT—If a litigated patent has previously been licensed to a third party,
the courts generally adopt the terms of the prior agreement as the best measure of
damages. However, while administratively convenient, this “licensing-based
damages” standard creates problematic incentives and undermines the efficient
commercialization of patented inventions. It rests on the trivialized (and generally
false) presumption that a patent license is like a commodity, with the patentee
charging a common price to all comers. As a consequence, patentees distort their
future recovery prospects—and, by extension, the outcomes of future licensing
negotiations—whenever they license their patents, whether or not today’s
agreement will be a good proxy for tomorrow’s dealings or disputes. Knowing this,
patentees are discouraged from licensing at anything less than a high royalty rate,
even if they could reach many additional mutually beneficial agreements on more
modest terms. The result is that patent holders rationally cut off the bottom segment
of the licensing market, creating substantial deadweight loss. This injures not only
patentees but also prospective licensees and their consumers. The standard creates
additional problems by encouraging secrecy and gamesmanship in patent
licensing.
We propose that the licensing-based damages standard be abandoned and that
damages should generally be awarded ad hoc. This does not mean that private
parties should ignore comparable licenses in their private dealings; it simply
means that courts should not use them as a measure of damages. That this
necessitates some speculation does not suggest it is the less desirable approach, for
it is better that damages be somewhat random than systematically harmful.
Further, while the licensing-based damages standard is easy to apply, there is little
reason to believe it is accurate in the typical case. As such, its apparent lack of
randomness does not suggest that it is producing good results.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As a first principle, the role of patent damages is to compensate patentees for
past or future infringement. But this simplistic characterization provides little
guidance for constructing effective remedial standards. The truth is that patent
remedies are far less consequential within the courtroom than outside of it. Private
dealings vastly outnumber litigated disputes, 1 but they all occur in the proverbial
“shadow of litigation.” Incentives to invent are similarly colored by expectations
about the remedies that support patent enforcement. And these expectations are
formed by observing the calculus with which the courts compute damages. Thus,
as a policy issue, what matters most is not the number of dollars awarded in a
particular case, but rather the legal standard used to choose that amount. Such
standards have a substantial impact on the private exchange of patent rights and
should therefore be viewed as an important policy lever for encouraging the
efficient dissemination and commercialization of patented technologies.
This article addresses a particularly problematic standard for computing patent
damages—which we call “licensing-based damages.” Under this standard,
1

See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Spring
2005, at 75, 75 (noting that less than 1.5% of patents are ever litigated, and only .1% ever reach
trial).
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damages are based on the monetary terms of prior licensing agreements involving
the litigated patent. We are particularly interested in damages awards based on
prior agreements in which the present plaintiff licensed the now-disputed patent.
The licensing-based damages standard is perhaps best known as the first of the
fifteen Georgia-Pacific factors, 2 which provide guidance for computing patent
damages consisting in a “reasonable royalty.” 3 However, its use dates back as far
as the late 19th century. 4
Today, licensing-based damages are commonly used in disputes involving
patents that have been licensed in the past. 5 The courts tend to view this standard
as not only convenient, but also accurate. For instance, the Federal Circuit has
remarked that, “[w]here an established royalty for the patented invention is shown
to exist, that rate will usually be adopted as the best measure of reasonable and
entire compensation.” 6 In the courts’ view, the royalty rate from a prior agreement
is a strong indicator of what the defendant in suit would have paid for the same
rights. Indeed, it is thought to “remove the need to guess at the terms to which the
parties would hypothetically agree.” 7 The implication is that the defendant would
have paid the same amount as the prior licensee, notwithstanding that the litigants
reached no such agreement on their own.
The problem with licensing-based damages is that they tether patentees to the
terms of their prior dealings, and this distorts both litigation outcomes and licensing
behavior in a number of harmful ways. Perhaps the most serious problem is that it
undermines efficient patent licensing and hence prevents patented inventions from
being efficiently disseminated and commercialized. 8 When a patentee licenses its
patent, this standard forces it to hedge against the possible future consequences of
the present agreement on its future dealings and disputes. This discourages patent
holders from licensing at anything less than a high royalty rate—even if additional

2

Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), mod. and aff'd, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971) (listing “the royalties received by [the plaintiff]
for licensing the patent, proving or tending to prove an established royalty” as the first of fifteen
factors for computing reasonable royalties).
3
35 U.S.C. § 284 (INSERT YEAR) (“[T]he court shall award the claimant damages adequate to
compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty.”). The most
common interpretation of the reasonable royalty is that it equals what the parties would have
agreed to in a counterfactual arm’s length licensing negotiation. E.g., Mark Lemley,
Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 655, 661 (2009).
4
See, e.g., Clark v. Wooster, 119 U.S. 322, 326 (1886) (“It is a general rule in patent cases that
established license fees are the best measure of damages that can be used.”).
5
See Jonathan S. Masur, The Use and Misuse of Patent Damages, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 115, 120
(2015) (“Courts have relied upon existing licenses in calculating damages for decades, and the
practice has grown even more prominent in recent years.”).
6
Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 347 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
7
Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
8
For the related proposition that this damages standard is unlikely to provide an accurate measure
of harm, see Masur, supra note 5, at 120 (“[T]here is doubt as to whether existing licenses can
provide reliable evidence of reasonable royalty damages.”).
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mutually beneficial agreements could be reached at lower rates—due to the fear
that anything less would weaken its patent by limiting its future recovery.
This is in stark contrast to the way agreements are normally formed. Ideally,
both parties to a deal would view their transaction as an isolated event that will not
bind them in future dealings or disputes with third parties. This is the logic that
underpins the privity of contract doctrine. But the licensing-based damages rule
makes this impossible. For example, suppose a patentee would like to license to
some “fringe competitors,” which present only a nominal commercial threat, but
not to its primary rival. Licensing is virtually always welfare-enhancing, so this
outcome would be efficient. But the licensing-based damages standard may
prevent it from happening, and may instead lead the patentee to refuse to license to
anyone. Indeed, an agreement with a fringe competitor would create a false
inference that the patentee would have willingly licensed to its primary rival at the
same rate. This may be an unacceptable risk, leading the patent holder to rationally
(albeit reluctantly) refuse to license with anyone.
The patentee is concerned not only with adversely impacting its future litigation
prospects, but also with the fees it can earn in future licensing. If the patent holder
were to license at a modest royalty rate, the resulting limitation on future recovery
provides a bargaining chip with which future licensees may secure lower fees than
they would otherwise pay. Thus, because patent holders are concerned with
keeping their patents as strong as possible, they will be reluctant to strike any
licensing deals that might undermine the perceived value of their patents.
One inherent problem with the licensing-based damages standard is that it
reflects a trivialized view of patent rights as commercial objects. It treats them like
commodities, such as grain or lumber, that are always sold to everyone at a common
price. But in fact there are many variables that would tend to create a disparity in
the licensing terms reached in different agreements. Section II provides a
comprehensive list of such factors. For example, many patented inventions can be
applied in a number of different ways or within different kinds of products, which
vary in their commercial value. Alternatively, the royalty rate in a licensing
agreement may reflect factors that have nothing to do with patent value; for
example, a high royalty rate may be used essentially as a financing device, allowing
a pre-revenue licensee to avoid paying a large lump sum and instead pay as she
goes.
Due to the many variables that influence the terms of licensing agreements,
price discrimination—charging different royalty rates to different licensees—
becomes an essential condition for efficiency in patent licensing markets. If patent
holders feel obligated to stick to a fixed price for all licensees, then they may forgo
many mutually beneficial deals that could only be reached on more modest terms.
That is to say, rigid pricing will produce deadweight loss, which is a wellunderstood problem in economics. Thus, ideally patent holders would feel free to
price discriminate—to charge low royalties to low-value licensees and high
4
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royalties to high-value licensees. Furthermore, unlike many consumer products,
the value of a patent license is usually high in relation to the relevant transaction
costs, making it generally feasible for a patentee to price discriminate through ad
hoc negotiations with different licensees. But the licensing-based damages
standard discourages them from doing this. It induces them to strike only the most
lucrative licensing deals and thereby keep the royalty rate high, even if additional,
valuable deals could be reached at lower rates.
The problems with licensing-based damages extend beyond the disincentive
they create for price discrimination. If licenses can reduce the amount of damages
a patent owner will receive at trial—and thus reduce the amount of future licenses
as well—patent owners have incentives to conceal or obscure the licensing deals
they have struck. They might couple licenses with other goods such as trademarks
or trade secrets that the licensee does not really want or need in an attempt to render
the licenses less useful to courts as guides to damages. Or they might simply
attempt to conceal the license using confidentiality agreements and prevent it from
ever reaching the public. These tactics, whichever form they take, will likely
increase transaction costs, make settlements less likely, and obscure information
that could function as a public good. Courts’ misuse of licensing-based damages
can thus do violence to the IP-licensing ecosystem.
In light of the foregoing conclusions, we propose that the licensing-based
damages standard be abandoned and that courts instead award damages ad hoc, on
the basis of the value of the technology to the infringer. 9 This does not mean that
comparable licenses should not have any influence on the parties. On the contrary,
assessments of comparable licenses are quite helpful in private licensing
negotiations, and they should be considered in this context. What we suggest, by
contrast, is that the courts should not rely on the terms of a prior licensing deal as a
measure of the plaintiff’s damages. That standard treats any licensing agreement
as an implicit commitment by the patentee to accept the stipulated royalty rate as
the measure of damages in all future disputes, and this systematically distorts
private behavior in licensing markets.
In principle, there may be some situations in which the licensing-based damages
standard is appropriate, or at least less harmful. This may be so if the patentee has
widely licensed the infringed patent on nondiscriminatory terms. 10 However, as
we will show, the standard is still likely to produce an inapt measure of damages in
this situation, at least if there was pre-judgment uncertainty as to whether the
plaintiff would prevail in court. The prior royalty rate, while stable over time,
reflected uncertainty as to whether the plaintiff would win. If the court applies this
9

See David O. Taylor, Using Reasonable Royalties to Value Patented Technology, 49 GA. L. REV.
79 (2014) (advocating this type of approach).
10
In particular, this may be so if the patent is very widely licensed at a common rate. For example,
some patentees make a commitment to license their patents on reasonable and nondiscriminatory
(RAND) terms. These commitments are often applied to patents that are essential to an adopted
technology standard, in which case they will be licensed by most or all firms who products read on
the standard. See note 18, infra.
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royalty rate as-is, it implicitly discounts the patentee’s recovery to reflect that
uncertainty, notwithstanding that it has just eliminated all uncertainty by holding
the patent valid and infringed. We show that this will lead to systematic undercompensation over time, assuming that ad hoc damages (expectations of which
determine the terms in the first agreement) are accurate in expected value.
The arguments in the prior paragraph also explain why it is not enough to
demand that courts be more careful to ensure that the relied-upon agreements are
sufficiently “comparable.” Even if the commercial circumstances are largely
equivalent, the fact that the prior agreements were reached under uncertainty
suggests that they are generally an inaccurate measure of damages. More generally,
damages should not be based on economic data that have not been distorted by the
parties’ expectations about what damages will be. Doing so creates a circularity
problem that undermines efficiency in licensing markets.
Econometrics has a term for the bias created by this kind of circularity problem:
endogeneity. 11 In effect, endogeneity means that that the modeler—or, in our case,
the courts—is relying on a mistaken conception of how some causal relationship
actually works. When the courts apply the licensing-based damages standard, the
endogeneity problem is the following: the court believes that economic factors
alone are shaping licensing terms, and that only these terms are in turn shaping
future damages awards. The court thus presumes that economic factors alone are
shaping its damages awards. But in fact the licensing-based damages standard has
a causal effect on future licensing terms, and this effect is not related to any
economic factors relevant to the agreement in question. This, by extension, means
that licensing terms are not actually a good measure of damages because they are
distorted by the courts’ remedial standards. An ironic corollary is that licensing
terms are actually less reliable as a proxy for harm than they would be if the
licensing-based damages standard did not exist.
This Article proceeds in four additional Parts. In Part II, we describe the
operation of a healthy patent licensing market. In Part III, we explain how courts’
use of licensing-based damages can lead to artificial reductions in the damages
awarded at trial, and thus to artificial reductions in future licensing revenue as well.
In Part IV, which is the heart of the paper, we describe the effects of these
distortions on the licensing market. We explain that patent owners will be less
inclined to price discriminate, that they will attempt to bundle patent licenses with
unnecessary other goods in order to render licenses less transparent, and that in
many cases they will simply hide licenses behind confidentiality agreements. Part
V concludes with some tentative policy recommendations.

KEVIN D. HOOVER, CAUSALITY IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS, THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, 2d Ed. 2008, (Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume, eds.) (providing an overview
11

of
endogeneity
and
causality
in
economic
http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_C000569.
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II. PATENT LICENSING MARKETS
For every patent, there is a potential licensing market in which the patent holder
may sell the rights to make, use, or sell technologies covered by the patent. As with
any other market, we would like a licensing market to operate efficiently, meaning
that no possible mutually beneficial transactions are foregone. 12 In addition to
benefitting both licensing parties, these transactions create a positive externality in
the form of enhanced consumer welfare in the licensee’s product market. Indeed,
a licensee desires a license precisely because it will allow it to offer a new,
improved, or less expensive product to its consumers, allowing it to capture
additional profits while also improving consumer welfare. And of course a patentee
benefits from mutually beneficial licensing by definition, so a healthy licensing
market only strengthens the incentive to invent. Thus, by encouraging both the
development and the dissemination of new inventions, an efficient licensing market
allows society to have its cake and eat it too.
Although the principal ambition of the patent system is to promote innovation,
it clearly has a secondary interest in encouraging the dissemination and
commercialization of patented inventions through efficient patent licensing.
Because all patent licensing occurs “in the shadow of litigation,” patent remedies
play a prominent role in shaping licensing behavior. Most patentees will never
actually receive a remedy (because most patents are never litigated), 13 but beliefs
about patent remedies influence virtually all patent licensing. Thus, expectations
about damages do most of the work, and these expectations are formed principally
by the general rules that courts use to calculate damages. For a licensing market to
achieve efficiency, these rules must shape incentives in such a way that patent
holders are not discouraged from licensing.
Many patents could be licensed on mutually beneficial terms to at least some
prospective user. 14 This is particularly likely when technologies are complex and
can be applied in a number of different kinds of products. For example, mutually
beneficial licensing is always possible if the patented technology can be usefully
applied by firms that do not compete with the patent holder. The extreme case,
which is now quite common, arises when the patent holder is a non-practicing entity
that sells no products and thus does not compete with anyone. 15

12

Mutually beneficial licensing is possible when a potential licensee values the use of the patented
invention more than the patent holder values the exclusion of the licensee’s use.
13
Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 1, at 75.
14
Here, and throughout this paper, we focus on patents with legitimate commercial value.
However, there are many patents that do not have commercial value, in which case there are no
prospective users willing to pay for a license. See, e.g., THOMAS F. COTTER, COMPARATIVE
PATENT REMEDIES 46 (2013) (“[M]any patents have little or no commercial value. . . .”).
15
A non-practicing entity is a firm that owns and enforces patents, but does not actually
manufacture any products that rely on them. E.g., Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglass Melamed,
Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2118 (2013).
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Even if a prospective user is a competitor, however, licensing may benefit the
competitor more than it hurts the patent holder. In such a case, the parties can still
reach a mutually beneficial deal, notwithstanding that it provides a boost to the
patentee’s rival. For example, if the parties’ products are sufficiently differentiated,
then competition will not be too fierce, in which case the patentee may not face
serious injury by selling a license. Another obvious explanation is the availability
of non-infringing alternative technologies. If a rival licensee has a viable
alternative option, then licensing may be in the patentee’s best interest, even if its
first choice would be to exclude the licensee from the market altogether. After all,
the alternative technology might impact competition in substantially the same way,
but it would not entitle the patentee to collect licensing fees. 16 As this analysis
demonstrates, mutually beneficial licensing is legitimately impossible only if (1)
all possible licensing applications would substantially increase the degree of
competition faced by the patent holder; and (2) prospective licensees do not have
reasonably viable alternatives to the patented technology. 17
At the time a patent is granted, the patent holder is the only party with the right
to use the patented invention. To the extent that mutually beneficial licensing is
possible, this initial allocation of patent rights is inefficient. Ronald Coase
famously pointed out the significance of the initial allocation of property rights in
markets where, for one reason or another, the relevant parties may not be able to
transact efficiently. 18 He noted that
the initial delimitation of legal rights does have an effect on the efficiency
with which the economic system operates. One arrangement of rights may
bring about a greater value of production than any other. But unless this
is the arrangement of rights established by the legal system, the costs of
reaching the same result by altering and combing rights through the
market may be so great that this optimal arrangement of rights . . . may
never be achieved. 19
Coase focused on transaction costs as the principal threat to market efficiency.
But more generally the threat could be anything that gets in the way of efficient
trade, such as a legal rule that discourages efficient patent licensing. And the courts
may create such an incentive when they tether patentees to the terms of their prior
dealings with nonparty licensees—a result that injures patentees, prospective
licensees, and consumers.

A. ANATOMY OF AN EFFICIENT LICENSING MARKET
16

A similar possibility arises if the prospective licensee has a reasonably strong argument that the
patent is invalid, in which case the alternative to licensing might be litigation resulting in the
patent’s invalidation. Here too licensing to a rival may be preferable to the alternative.
17
This is most likely to occur in situations where the patented technology essentially constitutes
the final product all by itself, such as a patented pharmaceutical compound.
18
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 16 (1960).
19
Id.
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In order to determine how standards for computing damages are likely to impact
licensing markets, the first question to ask is how a well-functioning licensing
market would operate in a typical case. For example, what factors determine the
license fees in a particular case? How consistent are the terms and scope of
different transactions for the same licensing rights? This section addresses these
issues and demonstrates that, for a number of reasons, patent licensing markets tend
to be more complex and irregular than conventional product markets.
Some markets, such as the market for toasters, are quite simple. They involve
very little variability among the terms or scope of different transactions. All buyers
of a particular model will receive exactly the same toaster, and they will all use it
for the same purpose: making toast. Further, because transaction costs are high in
relation to transaction value, the manufacturer will set a fixed price, and all buyers
will pay exactly that amount. Thus, if the price of the toaster is fixed at $10, then
we can safely presume this is the same amount that any counterfactual buyer would
have been made to pay for it.
For other kinds of products, such as home remodeling, the market is much less
consistent, with comparatively little similarity among different transactions. A
typical contractor may remodel a hundred homes, but he is probably not asked to
do exactly the same thing in any two cases. Thus not all customers are receiving
the same thing. Similarly, because some remodels are more elaborate or difficult
than others, the price level will vary from one transaction to the next. A home
renovator will not charge a fixed amount to all customers but will instead negotiate
a custom agreement with each customer. As such, it is largely impossible to
identify an “established price” in the market for home renovations.
When courts rely on licensing-based damages, they implicitly treat patent
licenses like toasters; they presume that the price paid by one licensee is a strong
predictor of what any other licensee would pay for the same rights. But the truth is
that patent rights are much more complex, and in fact they tend to act more like
home renovations. 20 There are many important variables, discussed in detail below,
that will tend to affect the terms of trade with different prospective licensees. If the
patent holder simply charged a fixed price to everyone, many potential licensees
would simply refuse to license. This is the case even if the parties could reach a
mutually beneficial agreement at a lower price. Furthermore, much like a home
renovation, the value of a licensing transaction is usually high in relation to

20

A prominent exception is a licensing market for a standards-essential patent: a patent whose
claimed technology must be used by any product that comports with a particular technological
standard. Such patents are very widely-licensed, and frequently the patent holders pledge that they
will be licensed on “reasonable and nondiscriminatory” (RAND) terms, which will involve setting
a common royalty rate for all licensees. See, e.g., Scott J. Miller, Standard Setting, Patents, and
Access Lock-In: RAND Licensing and the Theory of the Firm, 40 IND. L. REV. 351, 353 (2007).
In these cases, the licensing market looks more like a conventional product market.
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transaction costs, enabling patent holders to bargain individually with licensees. 21
Thus, within patent licensing markets, price discrimination—the practice of
charging different prices to different customers 22 —is generally a necessary and
feasible way of achieving market efficiency. 23 Yet by treating patent rights like
commodities, the courts inadvertently discourage price discrimination and, by
extension, the efficient licensing of patented inventions. We address this issue in
greater detail below.
Intuitively, if there is a diverse set of prospective licensees, then it is unlikely
that linear pricing—charging the same price to everyone—will achieve market
efficiency. In such a case, the patent holder will have to charge different prices to
different buyers. In the extreme case the patent holder would engage in “first
degree” or “perfect” price discrimination, meaning that it charges each potential
licensee a price that is exactly equal to its willingness to pay for a license, which
would reach an efficient result by eliminating deadweight loss. 24 However, it is not
actually necessary that the patent holder gets all of the trade surplus in every
transaction; as a matter of efficiency, it is just as well (and certainly more equitable)
for the patent holder to bargain individually with all prospective licensees, in each
case choosing a price that leaves both parties better off. 25 In what follows we refer
to this more general variety of price discrimination as discriminatory bargaining.
The differential welfare effects of linear pricing and discriminatory bargaining
are easily seen in the juxtaposed graphs in Figure 1. Here the top and bottom graphs
correspond to linear pricing and discriminatory bargaining, respectively. The xaxis can be interpreted as the set of prospective licensees, arranged in decreasing
order of their willingness to pay (WTP) for a license. The dotted line in each graph
21

Another reason bargaining would tend to be feasible here is that a licensor may be able to
determine how much value the licensee derives from the relevant patent rights by simply
considering the licensing application and how it will affect the licensee’s product. By contrast, if
the relevant product is a toaster, there is a significant asymmetric information problem because the
seller cannot generally predict the value a buyer places on the toaster.
22
More accurately, price discrimination means a disparity in prices charged to different customers
that is not explained by a corresponding disparity in the costs of supplying these different buyers.
However, for our purposes it is sufficient simply to consider all situations that might induce a
patent holder to charge different fees to different licensees. That is, in what follows, “price
discrimination” refers to any situation in which a patent holder receives different fees from
different licensees of the same patent. Note that, unless a firm always prices at marginal cost,
price discrimination is always necessary to achieve economic efficiency. However, due to high
transaction costs, perfect price discrimination is almost never feasible.
23
The concept of price discrimination was first introduced by economist Arthur Pigou. See
ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 275–289 (1920). For a modern overview of
price discrimination and its effects, see Hal R. Varian, Price Discrimination, HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 597 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
24
See, e.g., Daniel J. Gifford and Robert T. Kurdle, The Law and Economics of Price
Discrimination in Modern Economies: Time for Reconciliation? 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235,
1241 (2010) (noting that first degree price discrimination eliminates deadweight loss).
25
That is, all mutually beneficial deals are executed, but we make no assumption about how the
parties split the licensing surplus in any given transaction.
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gives the prices charged to these licensees. A licensee will pay for a license only if
its willingness to pay exceeds the price it is charged. Linear pricing generates
deadweight loss, which captures the forgone value of efficient deals that were not
executed, because not all buyers have a WTP that exceeds the constant price level.
By contrast, under discriminatory bargaining, the price is lower for a licensee
with a lower WTP, reflecting that bargaining allows the patent holder to tailor each
license fee to the specific needs and preferences of the corresponding licensee. The
patent holder is able to transact with all prospective licensees, which achieves
market efficiency. 26 In each graph, market welfare (of the patent holder and its
licensees) is given by the sum of the unshaded regions, CS (consumer surplus,
which captures the welfare of licensees), and PS (producer surplus, which captures
the welfare of the patent holder). As the graphs reflect, market welfare is higher
under discriminatory bargaining. There is no deadweight loss in this case because
no efficient transactions are forgone. Accordingly, QDB > QLP, where the numbers
QDB and QLP give the quantities of licenses sold under discriminatory bargaining
and linear pricing, respectively.
The problem with linear pricing is that it cuts off the bottom segment of the
market. The only efficient linear price would be zero. But the patent holder, which
maximizes its own licensing receipts, would never set such a generous price. This
would give it a profit of zero. Rather, just like an oligopolist in a conventional
product market, the patent holder charges an inefficiently high price to everyone.
Thus price discrimination is preferable for both licensees and the patent holder.

26

More accurately, the patent holder licenses to every prospective licensee with whom mutually
beneficial licensing is possible. As noted below, if a prospective user is a direct competitor, then
there may be no licensing terms that would leave both parties better off.
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FIGURE 1: Linear Pricing (Top) Versus Discriminatory Bargaining (Bottom)
There are a number of reasons why a typical patent holder would like to
discriminate in the terms of different licensing transactions. First, different
licensees may not be willing to pay the same amount. This is not only a function
of the licensee’s characteristics. It can also be a result of changes in the number of
alternative technologies that are available, or of the circumstances under which a
licensing agreement is reached. Furthermore, a patent holder may have its own
motivations for charging different amounts to different users. In what follows, we
illustrate some of the most important variables that will tend to affect the terms of
trade, variables that are largely ignored when a court focuses myopically on prior
licensing terms.
(i) Alternative licensing applications. Different licensees may intend to
apply the patented technology in different ways, which may vary in the
extent to which they enhance the licensees’ profits. For example, suppose
the patented technology is a spray-on coating that makes steel products
more resistant to rust. There are many product manufacturers that could
benefit from this. At one end of the spectrum, a licensee that manufactures
mufflers for cars would receive substantial utility from the invention, for
rust creates holes that prevent a muffler from functioning. On the other
hand, a licensee that produces sledgehammers derives much less value from
the technology, implying it is not willing to pay nearly as much. Rust does
not impede the functionality of sledgehammers, so the benefit is merely a
shinier sledgehammer. Even though these two licensees have acquired the
12

HOW PATENT DAMAGES SKEW LICENSING MARKETS

Hovenkamp & Masur

same rights, they are paying for different kinds of product enhancements:
the muffler maker is paying for improved functionality, while the
sledgehammer maker is paying for an aesthetic improvement. As this
illustrates, a given patent license may represent very different things to
different licensees.
(ii) Obsolescence; increased competition in the licensing market. In
many cases, the value of a given patent license will depreciate over the
patent term. 27 There are two principal reasons for this. First, the patented
technology may grow obsolete over time, as it is gradually surpassed by
more sophisticated or popular technologies. For example, the digital video
disk (DVD) was initially a very popular technology for storing movies for
in-home viewing, but it is growing obsolete over time as improved
technologies like Blu-ray and digital streaming have become more widely
available. A related problem is that although a technology may not grow
obsolete in the sense that it becomes inferior, the licensing market may
nevertheless grow more competitive over time. 28 That is, as time passes,
more and more viable alternatives may enter the licensing market. And, of
course, prices are lower in a more competitive market, implying that license
fees will tend to fall as the field of competitors grows larger over time. This
means that the precedent set by a prior agreement may overstate the value
of a license later in the patent term.
(iii) Commercial relationship between the parties. A licensing
agreement benefits the patent holder only if it provides license fees in excess
of the benefit it would get by excluding the licensee’s use. And the value
of such exclusion is larger when the licensee is a competitor. Thus a patent
holder will tend to charge larger license fees to firms with which it competes
on some level. So, for example, if a patent holder charges a rival a $10 perunit royalty and later sells this patent to a non-practicing entity (NPE), it
does not follow that the NPE and a similar user would reach an agreement
for the same $10 per unit. On the other hand, if the patent holder and
licensee sell complementary products—e.g. a smartphone operating system
and smartphone apps—then the patent holder may be willing to accept a
lower license fee, all else being equal.

27

RICHARD A. POSNER & WILLIAM M. LANDES, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW, 311–12 (2003).
28
“Biosimilar” or “bioequivalent” pharmaceutical drugs are a good example. These drugs mimic
patented drugs without infringing their patents by using different molecules or compounds to
achieve substantially the same results. See, e.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc., 486 F. Supp.
2d 767 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (declining to hold that bioequivalent drug infringed pioneer patent under
the doctrine of equivalents simply because it achieved similar therapeutic results); Acorda
Therapeutics, Inc. v. Apotex, 2011 WL 4074116 at *9 (D.N.J. Sept. 6, 2011) (same); Adams
Respiratory Therapeutics, Inc. v. Perrigo Co., 616 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (explaining
difference between conclusion that a drug is bioequivalent and analysis of infringement under
doctrine of equivalents).
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(iv) Invention around the patent. A licensee is willing to pay less when
it is more feasible to invent around the patent, or when the benefits of
inventing around are larger. Thus, if one licensee is much more
technologically sophisticated than another, it would tend to be willing to
pay less for a license as it is better equipped to invent around the patent.
Similarly, all else being equal, invention around the patent is more valuable
when there is more time remaining in the patent term. The cost of inventing
around the patent (a fixed cost) will be amortized over a larger number of
sales. Thus, all else being equal, a patent holder would tend to be willing
to pay a larger royalty rate if there is less time remaining in the patent term,
in which case invention around is less worthwhile.
(v) Financial constraints. Patent licensing agreements often call for the
licensee to pay a two-part tariff: an initial lump sum in addition to a per-unit
royalty on licensed sales. 29 If a licensee is financially constrained at the
time of agreement—say, because its business is not yet profitable and it
does not have easy access to the capital markets—then it may be willing to
pay a larger royalty in order to avoid paying a large lump sum. Thus a high
royalty may simply reflect a financing deal aimed at spreading out the
licensee’s total obligations over time; if the deal instead involved a wellheeled licensee, the royalty rate might be much lower, even if both of these
licensees happen to get the same benefits from the license. The same logic
also applies in the other direction. If the patent holder is in poor financial
shape at the time of the agreement, it may be willing to accept a lower
royalty in exchange for a larger upfront fee. Here too this has nothing to do
with the value of a license.
(vi) Sunk-cost investments. In some cases, the patent holder has some
leverage over the licensee, enabling it to extract larger fees than it could
have hoped to garner in an arm’s length bargain. In particular, a licensee
may begin developing a technology only to discover that it is already
covered by an existing patent. In such a case, the patent holder can extract
the costs that have already been sunk in the technology by threatening to
“hold up” the infringer 30—an outcome it could not attain through ex ante
bargaining. 31 Accordingly, license fees will tend to be artificially high to
29

Michael D. Rostoker, PTC Research Report: A Survey of Corporate Licensing, 24 J.L. & TECH.
59, 64 (1984) (analyzing data on patent licensing, and noting that 46% of agreements in the dataset
involve both an upfront fixed fee and a per-unit royalty).
30
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1991, 2010 (2007) (“[T]he royalty negotiated in the shadow of litigation and holdup can
significantly exceed the intrinsic value of the invention itself.”).
31
For example, in the well-known Blackberry Case, the non-practicing entity NTP obtained an
injunction against Research in Motion (RIM), the firm that makes Blackberry devices. The
devices used an email system that was held to infringe NTP’s patents. But RIM had already made
considerable sunk-cost investments in this particular system, and it would be very expensive to
switch over to something else on short notice. This holdup problem gave NTP leverage to extract
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the extent that the licensee has already invested in using the patented
technology. 32
(vii) Information externalities. Because licensing terms are determined in
the shadow of litigation, they will depend critically on the parties’ beliefs
about how litigation would turn out. Thus any new information that sheds
light on this question may alter the terms of subsequent licensing. For
example, if a patent holder has already successfully litigated its patent, then
it will tend to charge higher fees in subsequent licensing negotiations, all
else being equal. The parties update their beliefs based on what they learned
from the lawsuit, and so a successful lawsuit will tend to shift expectations
in favor of the patentee. Alternatively, the establishment of a new legal
precedent—say, a refinement of some relevant patent eligibility rules—may
shed new light on whether the patent is likely to be held valid, and this too
would tend to affect the licensing terms in subsequent negotiations.
(viii) Uncertain value of a licensing application. Related to the last point,
at the time of contracting the patent holder and its prospective licensee may
be uncertain as to how much value the patented invention will provide the
licensee. For example, it may be that the patented invention has not
previously been applied in the way contemplated by the licensee. As such,
the royalty rate in the first licensing transaction would ordinarily be lower
or higher than in subsequent agreements, depending on whether the
application proves to have relatively low or high value. For example, if the
first application does better than expected, then subsequent licensees would
ordinarily pay more for it, all else being equal.
(ix) Patent complementarities. If a licensee already has the rights to one
or more patents that are complementary to the one being licensed, then it
a massive settlement worth more than $600M – about twenty times the amount that the lower
court had awarded as damages. See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 2d 785
(E.D. Va. 2005). As numerous commenters have noted, this holdup problem allows the plaintiff
to capture a much larger payoff than it could even have obtained in an arm’s length deal. See, e.g.,
Lemley & Shapiro, Patent Holdup, supra note 28, at 2010.
32
The courts already recognize an extreme case of this leverage problem. In particular, if an
independent inventor goes so far as to commence infringing sales by the time licensing negotiations
commence—implying licensing is achieved under threat of litigation—then a court will typically
place less evidentiary weight on this agreement when calculating damages in a later case. See, e.g.,
Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1078–79 (Fed.Cir.1983) (noting that license
fees set in settlement of an infringement action should not serve as a basis for damages, since they
“may be strongly influenced by a desire to avoid full litigation”); Masur, supra note 5, at 124–25
(“[C]ourts and commentators generally disfavor licenses that parties negotiated as settlements to
ongoing litigation.”) Paradoxically, however, some courts decline to adhere to this limitation
despite acknowledging that it exists. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 2016
WL 937220, at *4 (D. Del. Mar. 10, 2016) (noting that settlements are generally not a good basis
for damages, but nevertheless awarding damages based on a settlement, citing the fact that the
settlement involved a patent that was “sufficiently comparable” to the patent in suit).
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derives a larger marginal benefit from the license, all else being equal. This
could arise because the patented technologies are complementary in the
sense that it is convenient to use them both simultaneously, or because the
licensee has a patent that is blocked by the licensed patent. 33 For example,
suppose the licensee has a patent on an improved version of the technology
covered by the licensor’s patent. The licensee would be willing to pay not
for the right to use the patentee’s inferior technology, but for the right to use
its own superior version. All else being equal, this licensee’s willingness to
pay is higher than that of an alternative licensee who lacks any rights to the
improvement.
As the above examples illustrate, there are many variables that shape the terms
of a licensing agreement. For a licensing market to operate efficiently, patent
holders must not be discouraged from price discrimination when licensing to
different licensees. Of course, some (but not all) of the variables discussed above
are already addressed in later Georgia-Pacific factors. For example, factor five
highlights the relevance of the commercial relationship between the plaintiff and
defendant, such as whether they sell competing or complementary products, as
addressed in point (iii) above. 34 But the point is that these factors, along with the
other variables mentioned above, tend to undermine the appropriateness of factor
one as the sole or primary basis for calculating patent damages.

III. COLLATERAL EFFECTS OF PATENT LICENSING
Ideally, a single instance of patent licensing would be an isolated event that
binds only the parties, and only to the extent contemplated by their agreement. In
this case, licensing would not create disadvantages in future dealings or disputes
arising outside the scope of the agreement. But when courts rely on prior
agreements as a basis for damages, they unwittingly tether patentees to the terms of
their prior agreements, and consequently patent licensing may have some
problematic repercussions.

A. REDUCED FUTURE DAMAGES
In Part II we described the many reasons why the licensing price agreed to by
one licensee might not accurately reflect the value of the same patent to another
licensee. For a variety of reasons, patent owners might charge one licensee more
or less than another, even for the same license to the same patent. Accordingly,
33

Patent A blocks patent B if one cannot practice B without also practicing A. This means that a
licensee who wants to use the technology covered by B must obtain licenses for both patents. See
Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655,
2659–60 (1994).
34
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), mod. and aff'd, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971) (listing “[t]he commercial relationship between
the licensor and licensee, such as, whether they are competitors” as the fifth factor).
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even at first blush the amount of a prior patent license may not provide an accurate
guide to patent damages in a later case. However, these types of errors will be
random, rather than biased. Sometimes the price of a license will be greater for the
first licensee than the second; sometimes less. If patent licenses introduced only
random errors, rather than biases, into courts’ calculations of damages, these errors
might be shrugged off as tolerable. After all, it is not as if the available alternative
methods for calculating damages are unerring.
Yet these are not the only or necessarily even the most severe distortions
introduced by using prior licenses as guides to patent damages at trial. The use of
licenses to calculate damages also creates a downward bias on patent damages due
simply to the probabilistic nature of patents. When a patent owner and potential
licensee negotiate a license, both parties are aware that there is some probability
that the patent will be held invalid or not infringed if the parties’ dispute were to go
to trial. The two parties may not share the same view as to this probability, and
they may not be able to estimate it with any great certainty. But it is the very rare
case in which either side can be certain that a court will find a patent valid and
infringed. In the vast majority of cases, there is some non-zero likelihood that the
defendant will prevail on one ground or another.
Accordingly, the value of any license will be reduced by the probability that the
patent owner will not prevail at trial. Suppose that patent owner P and potential
licensee L1 are negotiating a license to a patented technology that is part of a product
L1 is selling. Suppose further that L1 values the technology at $10 million and that
the parties believe that it is 50% likely that P’s patent will be held valid and
infringed at trial. P and L1 would typically agree to a license of approximately $10
million × 50% = $5 million, which represents a discount on the full price to
compensate for the uncertainty that is endemic to patent litigation. 35
Now imagine that P files suit and prevails at trial against a second infringer, L2,
that makes a product similar to L1’s. Once P’s patent has been found valid and
infringed, the court must assess damages against L2. 36 In order to do so, one of the
court’s principal sources of information would be the license that P negotiated with
L1. This license is the very first Georgia-Pacific factor; but more than that, it
represents (to the court) the market’s valuation of the patented technology. Given
the difficulty of accurately estimating the value of patented technology from expert
reports and pricing information alone, one would expect courts to seize upon this
type of market-based indicator. Indeed, this is what courts typically do. Past
35

To be sure, this simplified model elides many factors, including the possibility that the parties
would face asymmetric stakes in litigation, asymmetric costs, holdup problems, or any number of
other variables. This stripped-down analysis is offered in support of a single point: that the value
of any patent license will be discounted to reflect the uncertainty surrounding whether the patent
will in fact be held valid and infringed. Adding further complexity and detail to the model will not
alter that fact.
36
Damages are of course a jury question; our reference to “the court” is meant to include both the
jury’s calculation and the judge’s involvement in designing jury instructions, allowing (or not
allowing) evidence of damages, or adjudicating motions for additur or remittitur.
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licenses of the same or similar technology to similarly situated licensees are
considered highly reliable indicia of a patent’s value, and courts commonly award
damages in the range of prior licenses. Here, then, the court would likely award
damages against L2 and to P of approximately $5 million in accordance with the
license that P and L1 negotiated.
Yet a damages award of $5 million would be error. The appropriate amount of
damages the licensing fee that the parties would have negotiated had they agreed
that the patent was valid and infringed. That figure is $10 million—the full value
of the patented technology to L1. The $5 million license is the full value of the
technology discounted by the probability that the patent will be held invalid or not
infringed. It is a matter of black-letter patent law that the court must assess damages
based upon a hypothetical negotiation in which the patent was assumed to be valid
and infringed. A court cannot simply treat an actual license as if it were granted
pursuant to a negotiation in which both parties viewed the patent as valid and
infringed. It is rarely the case that both parties to a license will view infringement
and validity as certainties, and indeed such cases may not even exist. The court
cannot rely upon the $5 million license between P and L1 as if it represents the
underlying value of the patent stripped of all uncertainty.
Accordingly, when courts use existing licenses to assess damages, they will
inevitably undervalue the patents in suit. Every licensing amount will be
discounted to reflect some probability that the patent will be held invalid or not
infringed. If that probability is greater than zero, the licensing fee will be less than
the value of the underlying patented technology. Only in the rare case when the
parties agree that the patent is 100% likely to be held valid and infringed will the
license provide an accurate guide to damages. Otherwise, the license will represent
only some proportion of the overall value the court is attempting to determine.
Nor can the court back out the parties’ true value simply by scrutinizing the
license. Even if the parties did agree upon a value for the patent and a probability
of success at trial—and they likely did not—the license will not reveal this
information. The license will almost certainly include only one dollar figure: the
amount of the license itself. If two parties negotiate a license for $5 million, the
court will have no way to determine whether the parties believed that the patented
technology was worth $5 million and the patent was 100% likely to be held valid
and infringed, or whether the technology was worth $10 million and the patent was
50% likely to be valid and infringed, or some other arrangement.
This opacity presents a fundamental problem for any court that seeks to use
existing licenses as guides to patent damages. The court cannot determine the true
value of the patent from the license, and furthermore it would be error for the court
to simply use the value of the existing license as a measure of damages. The next
section explains why.

B. DISTORTED FEES IN FUTURE LICENSING
18
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The last section showed that licensing-based damages can lead to undercompensation by failing to account for uncertainties that shape license fees. A
corollary is that this under-compensation will generally translate into reduced fees
in future patent licensing. As already noted, licensing terms are shaped principally
by the parties’ expectations of how litigation would play out. Thus, if the parties
expect damages to undercompensate, then this provides prospective licensees with
a bargaining chip for securing lower license fees than the patentee would ordinarily
accept.
Consider an example. There are two prospective users – L1 and L2 – that would
like to license a patent owned by a patent holder, PH. For each prospective user,
the value of a license is $100K. For the sake of simplicity, assume each of their
intended applications clearly reads on the patent (i.e., there is no uncertainty on the
infringement question), but the patent may or may not be valid. Specifically, all
parties believe that there is a 50% probability that the patent will be held valid.
Suppose that PH is initially approached by L1 to strike a licensing deal. Since there
is no prior licensing deal on which to base damages, they presume that damages
would be assigned somewhat randomly, but with an expected value equal to the full
value of a license ($100K). 37 However, knowing that there is a 50% chance that
the patent is invalid, they discount this amount by half, and thus agree on a fee of
$50K.
Now suppose that, after this agreement is formed, L2 approaches PH to strike a
second licensing deal. The parties expect that a court would base damages on the
prior agreement, providing an award of $50K. However, as before, the parties
believe that PH has only a 50% chance of winning, so they discount the expected
award by half, resulting in a license fee of $25K. Thus, even though there are no
material differences between the licensees, the second agreement results in lower
fees. By contrast, if the courts did not adhere to the licensing-based damages
standard, then nothing would change in the second agreement; the negotiated fee
would be the same $50K.
The problem is that, by basing damages on the prior license fee, the courts fail
to filter out the “uncertainty discount”—the percentage by which the license fee
was reduced to reflect PH’s uncertain litigation prospects—from the prior
agreement. The damages award subsumes this uncertainty discount. But
subsequent licensing negotiations also occur under uncertainty—as before, PH is
not certain to win in court—resulting in a second round of discounting. As a
consequence, the fee reached in the second agreement carries two iterative
discounts—one reflecting uncertainty in the present agreement, and one reflecting
uncertainty in the first agreement. Of course, there is no good reason that the fee

37

This assumption is not at all essential to the argument; it just makes things simpler. Even if
expected damages were different from $100K, subsequent licensing would still result in lower
fees.
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charged in one agreement should reflect the uncertainty faced in another. But this
nonsensical result is nevertheless a rational response to licensing-based damages.
Even if there is no uncertainty about the patent holder’s litigation prospects, a
prior licensing agreement may come back to haunt the patent holder. This can occur
when efficient licensing would involve significant price discrimination. Consider
another example. A patent holder is initially approached by a prospective licensee,
Beta, who values a license at $100K. As in the preceding example, suppose that
the court’s damages, if not based on any prior agreements, would equal the full
licensing value ($100K) in expected value. But in this case suppose that the patent
holder is certain to win if it brings an infringement claim. Thus the patent holder
can extract a fee of the full $100K from Beta. 38
After this agreement is formed, another prospective user, Alpha, approaches the
patent holder. Alpha attaches much more value to the patented invention—say,
because it provides a larger incremental benefit when applied to Alpha’s product—
and is willing to pay as much as $500K for a license. If the parties expected
damages to equal the license value—as they did in the first agreement—then the
patent holder could extract a fee of $500K. However, this is not possible if damages
will be based on the prior agreement. In this case, the base for damages is the
$100K fee—just one fifth of what the patent holder would get but for the prior
agreement. In fact, even if Alpha were held to have willfully infringed, treble
damages would be just $300K, still substantially less than what the patent holder
could ordinarily get. 39 In either case, licensing-based damages inadvertently
compel the patent holder to give Alpha a steep discount.
In fact, the same problem could cut in the opposite direction, benefitting patent
holders and injuring defendants. This may be particularly pronounced in situations
in which a defendant has unintentionally infringed the patent and damages are
likely to be based on the terms of a prior agreement that happened to involve a
relatively high royalty rate. To illustrate, imagine that, in the above Alpha-Beta
example, Alpha had been the first to approach the patent holder, and thus the first
licensing agreement stipulated a $500K fee. Now suppose that Beta later
unintentionally infringed the patent. Based on the prior agreement with Alpha, a
court would require Beta to pay damages of $500K—five times more than it would
otherwise pay.
To synthesize what is going on here, suppose there are two licensing agreements
involving the same patent, one occurring at time t = 1, and the other occurring at
time t = 2. For each t, there is a distinct licensee, Lt. Then let Vt > 0 denote Lt’s
valuation for a license, and let pt denote the probability that the patent holder would
38
Alternatively, they could split the surplus in some way, as contemplated in the discriminatory
bargaining outcomes depicted in Figure 1. But for simplicity, we assume for now that the patent
holder can extract the full licensing surplus.
39
35 U.S.C. § 284 (INSERT YEAR) (stating that in cases of willful infringement, “the court may
increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed”).
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win an infringement suit against Lt. Note that 0 ≤ pt ≤ 1, since this is a probability.
Now assume that, if damages are awarded ad hoc, they will equal the defendant’s
license valuation (Vt) in expected value. Let Ft denote the fee charged in agreement
t, which will depend on the variables just defined. In the first agreement, there is
no prior deal that would influence damages. Thus, expected damages would be V1,
resulting in the fee
F1 = p1V1
This says that the fee in the first agreement is simply equal to expected damages
(L1’s valuation), discounted by the patent holder’s probability of winning. If courts
did not rely on licenses in calculating damages, the fee in the second would be
analogous—it would be p2V2—because the parties to this agreement would expect
damages to be V2 if the patent holder won in court. But if the prior fee F1 would
instead be the basis for damages, then the fee charged in the second agreement
would be
F2 = p2F1 = p2 × p1V1
Here we can see both of the problems that came up in the preceding examples.
First, F2 nonsensically reflects uncertainty from the first agreement, as captured by
the fact that it includes p1 as a factor. This discounts the fee based on uncertainty
that is entirely impertinent to the agreement in question. The second problem is
that F2 reflects the valuation of the wrong licensee—it includes the term V1 rather
than V2, even though the former is entirely irrelevant to the present agreement. This
could either increase or decrease the fee depending on how V1 and V2 compare.
Overall, F2 is lower than the proper fee (p2V2) when p1V1 < V2, and it is higher
when p1V1 > V2. 40
An implication of this analysis is that, even if there have been many prior
licensing deals involving a common royalty rate, it does not follow that the court
should use the established royalty as a measure of damages. The established royalty
was likely discounted by the parties’ uncertainty about whether the patent would
be held valid and infringed. If the court were to apply the established royalty as
damages, it would preserve this discount and award the infringer the same discount
it might have negotiated under conditions of uncertainty. This would be a
nonsensical result, for the court has just resolved that uncertainty. Preserving this
uncertainty-based discount limits the plaintiff’s recovery based on factors that have
nothing to do with the intrinsic value of a license or the commercial injury suffered
by the plaintiff. As such, there is no reason that such factors should influence the
remedy.

IV. IMPACT ON LICENSING INCENTIVES
40

One obvious caveat is that, unless the second licensee has unintentionally infringed, it will never
agree to pay more than V2. Thus, if p2p1V1 > V2, then F2 would be truncated to V2.
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The preceding section explained how licensing-based damages may distort
damages awards and, by extension, the terms of licensing agreements. These firstorder effects do not involve a direct change in the allocation of patent rights; they
simply alter the amount of money that changes hands in the course of licensing or
litigation. However, parties will anticipate these effects ex ante and adjust their
conduct accordingly, and this second-order effect may indeed influence how patent
rights are allocated. Thus, the more serious concern with licensing-based damages
is that they tend to distort licensing behavior and thereby undermine the efficient
dissemination of patent rights. This section addresses some of these adverse
incentive problems.

A. DIMINISHED LICENSING
A patent is only as strong as the remedies that can be obtained to enforce it.41
Thus, with the intention of maintaining the strongest rights possible, patent holders
would not want to do anything that might undermine their ability to receive a strong
remedy in the future. When the courts rely on licensing terms as a basis for
damages, patent holders influence future remedies whenever they strike a licensing
deal. As such, they have a strong incentive to make their patents appear valuable
by licensing on relatively lucrative terms, ensuring future remedies will be
comparatively strong. Unfortunately, this kind of posturing will tend to require that
the patent holder forgo efficient licensing deals that can only be reached on more
modest terms. The result is that the licensing-based damages standard diminishes
the number of efficient licensing deals that are executed, thereby creating
deadweight loss.
If efficient licensing would involve a significant degree of price discrimination,
then licensing-based damages undermine efficiency by diminishing the patent
holder’s willingness to price discriminate. In such a case, there are a number of
different licensees willing to pay variable amounts. But if the patent holder
transacts with the low-valuation licensees, this may prevent it from collecting
satisfactory fees in transactions with the high-valuation licensees. This would also
undermine the damages the patent holder could obtain in future litigation. Thus, in
an effort to avoid these outcomes, the patent holder may rationally (albeit
regrettably) refuse to license to prospective users who are not willing to pay a
relatively large amount for a license.
A principal problem is that, at the time of licensing, a patent holder likely cannot
predict how the present agreement will impact it in the future, and as such it may
prefer to remain cautious and accept only a relatively high royalty rate in the
interim. This derives from uncertainty about its future licensing and litigation
prospects. For instance, a patent holder may be uncertain as to the various ways a
41

Masur, supra note 5, at 127; Dov Greenbaum, Academia to Industry Technology Transfer: An
Alternative to the Bayh-Dole System for Both Developed and Developing Nations, 19 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 311, 388 (2009) (“[W]ith no potential enforcement by the owner
of the IP, potential licensees may see no incentive to ever license the patent; infringing at will.”).
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patent could be usefully applied, or of which firms might be interested in licensing.
(In fact, it is unlikely that a typical patent holder has perfect information about these
things.) For example, at the time a patent is granted, the patent holder may suspect
that there are many possible applications, but it may have so far identified only a
few of them. In this case, a patent holder does not want to establish a low royalty
rate early in the patent term only to learn later on that its invention has some much
more valuable alternative applications. This would give the courts the mistaken
impression that the patent license is not particularly valuable, allowing licensees
using the more valuable application to get a steep discount. As such, a patent holder
may be relatively cautious or inflexible early in the term until it has a better
understanding of the patent’s applications, even if it could begin striking some
mutually beneficial licensing deals soon after the grant date.
Another possibility is that both the patent holder and licensees may be uncertain
how valuable the licensed invention will be in practice. For example, if a new
software program is added to a smartphone, it may be unclear ex ante how
consumers will respond to the addition and, by extension, how it will affect sales
of the smartphone. On one hand, a prospective licensee does not want to pay too
much for a license, for the patented technology may not prove particularly helpful.
On the other hand, the patent holder does not want to accept too low a royalty, for
if it turns out that the application is quite helpful, it may be compelled to offer future
licensees the same low rate. This reflects the fact that a prospective licensee is
thinking only about the deal in question, but the patent holder must think about how
the deal will affect its future licensing and litigation prospects. This could lead to
delays in licensing or to a complete breakdown in negotiations.
More generally, licensing-based damages will tend to replicate the deadweight
loss problem that results from linear pricing, which was illustrated in Figure 1. This
is not because it induces a patent holder to charge identical royalties to all comers.
Rather, it will tend to induce a patent holder to choose some minimum royalty rate
below which it refuses to license, and then bargain only with those firms willing to
match or exceed this threshold. Because there are likely to be some mutually
beneficial licensing opportunities requiring a lower royalty rate, this creates
deadweight loss by foreclosing some efficient transactions.
Diminished future license fees are not the only thing that may deter the patent
holder from licensing at a relatively modest royalty rate. The patent holder may
have a strong interest in excluding a direct competitor from using the patented
technology, and it may be able to do this only if it refuses to license at anything less
than a high royalty rate, or perhaps only if it declines to license at all. As noted in
an earlier section, it may be impossible for a patent holder and a direct competitor
to reach mutually beneficial licensing terms. This is not surprising, since the right
to exclude competitors is a principal source of patent value, and many firms do not
license their patents to direct competitors. However, it may nevertheless be
possible to license a patent to non-competitors, as the patented invention may have
useful applications within non-competing products. In this case, market efficiency
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would involve licensing to non-rivals, but not to the competitor. However, the
patent holder may rationally refuse to license to anyone, for licensing might
establish a royalty rate that it would never accept from the competitor, which would
provide its rival with leverage in future litigation. That is, licensing might prevent
the patent holder from getting an adequate remedy if the competitor went on to
infringe the patent.
Licensing-based damages need not always work to a patent holder’s detriment,
however, notwithstanding that they result in fewer licensing transactions. If the
patent holder earns significantly larger fees but strikes fewer licensing deals, the
former effect may dominate the latter, leading overall licensing revenues to
increase. This can happen if the market value of a license declines after the patent
has been licensed at a relatively high rate—say, because a number of competing
alternatives entered the licensing market—so that a licensee in an arm’s length
bargain would subsequently pay only a small fee. In this case, the patent holder’s
best strategy may be to rely on a “wait and sue” approach, sitting on its rights and
using its high-established royalty to secure supra-competitive fees from
unintentional infringers. In this case, the patent holder does not want to bargain at
arm’s length, even though this would likely result in more deals getting done,
because it could garner only small fees in these agreements. Rather, it prefers to
bargain only when it has leverage—liability for damages that will be based on the
high prior royalty—with which it can extract excessive fees.

B. ROYALTY GAMESMANSHIP
When patent owners do agree to license their IP, they will also have incentives
to obfuscate or distort the terms of those licenses. If courts will look to existing
licenses to determine patent damages, then patent owners have every reason to
structure those licenses such that the price appears to be as high as possible. There
are a variety of strategies that patent owners might employ, and here we canvas a
sampling of them.
First, the patent owner might attempt to bundle other goods along with the
patent as part of the license in exchange for a higher licensing price. 42 The patent
license might be drafted to include other forms of IP, such as trademarks or trade
secrets relevant to the patented technology. It might include the provision of tacit
knowledge, such as a promise by the patent owner to direct its scientists and
engineers to help the licensee implement the patented technology. 43 Or it might be
paired with a future promise of some type, such as an unstated agreement to
separately cross-license some other technology owned by the licensee.
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Masur, supra note 5, at 142.
See generally Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships, and
Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1503, 1516 (2012)
(explaining that patent licenses can facilitate the transfer of tacit knowledge).
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These types of maneuvers are not necessarily welfare-diminishing, though they
may result in future patent infringers being forced to pay excessive damages at trial.
However, the process of negotiating them could increase transaction costs. And if
the parties are not able to agree upon the higher price to be paid for these additional
considerations, the result could be that the opportunity to license the patent is
forgone entirely.
At least in theory, courts police existing licenses for this type of strategy. The
Federal Circuit has instructed trial courts that they are not to use existing licenses
as a measure of damages when those licenses include consideration other than
merely a license to the patent itself. 44 In practice, it is difficult to know how
successful these policing efforts really are. But even if courts are entirely
successful at weeding out patent licenses that include inducements beyond the
patent itself, that will only solve one problem—the problem of inflated damages
verdicts. In so doing, it will actually heighten the incentives of patent owners to
negotiate licenses that include more than just the right to use the patented
technology. Patent owners will understand that if they can lard up the license with
other considerations, courts will not rely upon the license as a guide to future
damages.
And because the use of existing licenses typically leads to
underestimations of patent damages, patent owners will be eager to take their own
existing licenses out of consideration. The result could be a proliferation of
needlessly complicated licenses involving considerations that neither party values
especially highly—and thus excessive transaction costs.
A second strategy that a patent owner might employ is to engineer the sequence
of licenses it negotiates, with the highest-value licenses negotiated first (and before
any trial occurs). For instance, low-volume licensees—parties who only plan to
use the patented technology in a small number of units or over a short time period—
might well be willing to pay higher per-unit prices than higher-volume users.
Because the patent license will consume a lower proportion of a low-volume user’s
overall budget, that user might be more willing to settle quickly on a higher price
rather than consuming greater resources haggling over a lower one.
There is nothing inherently problematic about strategically sequencing
licensing negotiations, but again, as with the tactics detailed above, any additional
complications introduced into the licensing process could derail parties from ever
reaching agreement. For instance, imagine a situation in which a large-volume
potential licensee wishes to negotiate a license to a valuable patent. The patent
owner might prefer to delay consummating this license until after a trial concludes,
or until after the patent owner has negotiated a separate license with another party
44

See ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 873 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“In sum, the district
court erred by considering ResQNet’s re-bundling licenses to significantly adjust upward the
reasonable royalty without any factual findings that accounted for the technological and economic
differences between those licenses and the ′075 patent.”); see also John Elmore, The Technological
Comparability of Patent License Agreements, 46 LES NOUVELLES 115, 116 (2011) (“[C]ase law
cautions that patent license agreements providing substantial non-patent benefits or multiple patents
may not be comparable to a ‘straight’ patent license.”).
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for the same technology. In the meantime, the potential licensee—not wishing to
be left in limbo—might adopt a different (and inferior) technology or simply drop
the relevant line of business entirely. The result would be needless social costs
driven entirely by the patent owner’s desire to structure its licensing behavior in
light of courts’ misuse of licenses in assessing damages.
Third and finally, a patent owner might attempt to structure the terms of a
licensing agreement to make the license appear more lucrative on a per-unit basis
than it actually is. There are a variety of ways to accomplish this, but the general
idea is that the license is written as if it covers fewer units or a shorter period of
time than it does in fact. 45 Accordingly, the license appears more valuable on a
per-unit basis to outside observers. For instance, suppose that a firm has been
infringing a patent from 2012 through 2016. Imagine that the parties are willing to
agree to a license of $10 million per year of infringing activity, or $40 million total.
The patent owner might instead suggest that the license to be written to cover the
years 2014 through 2016 only, yet for the same amount of $40 million. To a court
(or a future licensee), the licensing price would appear to be $20 million per year,
rather than $10 million per year. The parties might then arrive at an understanding
(which they do not memorialize) that the patent owner will not sue the licensee for
infringement from 2012 to 2014. Or the parties might simply rely upon the doctrine
of laches to block suit for that period. 46
A roughly equivalent strategy is to draft a license that intentionally understates
the number of units it is meant to cover. For instance, imagine that the patent owner
and putative licensee agree that the licensee intends to use the patented technology
in 10 million manufactured units and is willing to pay $4 per unit, or $40 million in
total. The parties might draft a license stating that the patent owner grants a license
in exchange for a lump sum of $40 million. The license might then further state
that the parties “anticipate that the licensee will produce 5 million units”—which
implies a price of $8 per unit. This language could be drafted to be unenforceable:
if the licensee produces more than 5 million units—which both parties expect will
occur—that does not void the license or alter its terms. For the licensee, nothing is
lost. And for the patent owner, the patented technology appears to be more valuable
than it actually is.
Or, in the alternative, a licensor could include geographic or field-of-use
restrictions that are meaningless to the particular licensee but make the license seem
more valuable than it really is. 47 For instance, a license granted to a firm that only
does business in California could be written to state that it is “only valid in
45

See Layne S. Keele, Res“Q”ing Patent Infringement Damages After ResQNet: The Dangers of
Litigation Licenses as Evidence of a Reasonable Royalty, 20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 181, 228
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See Carnegie Mellon University v. Marvell Technology Group, Ltd., 807 F.3d 1283, 1298 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (discussing the legal standard for laches in patent cases).
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Masur, supra note 5, at 142.
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California.” Or a license granted to a firm that manufactures medical devices could
be written to state that it “only applies to medical devices,” making it appear that a
more general blanket license would be more expensive. These sorts of tactics are
not merely hypothetical. There are several cases on record in which a patent
defendant has alleged that a licensor has engaged in one or more of these tactics in
an effort to inflate the perceived value of a patent license. 48
Again, the primary result of these practices will likely be to inflate the prices
that future licensees or infringers held liable at trial will be forced to pay. Standing
by itself, that may not create tremendous social loss. But the process of negotiating
such a license could involve greater transaction costs than would accrue if the
parties were “playing it straight,” and in some cases the result might be a foregone
licensing opportunity. These are potentially significant social costs, generated by
the ways in which courts use licenses to value patents.
The general theme of this section is that an arms-length market valuation of a
good, such as a patent, is only as reliable as the parties negotiating it. When one
party has an incentive to strategically inflate or alter the terms of that license, the
license can no longer be counted upon to provide accurate estimations of a patent’s
value. Moreover, the fact that licenses play such a central role in calculating patent
damages—and the manner in which courts employ licenses in that calculation—
creates incentives for patent owners who are repeat players to manipulate licensing
terms whenever possible. The ripple effects of courts’ treatment of licenses are
persistently negative.

C. CONFIDENTIALITY IN PATENT LICENSING
If patent licensees cannot inflate the value of the licenses they negotiate—or
perhaps even if they can—they might respond by attempting to keep the licenses
confidential. If information regarding the licenses cannot be disclosed, then they
cannot be used against the patentee to reduce damages at trial. Patentees might thus
protect licensing agreements with confidentiality provisions and non-disclosure
guarantees in an effort to prevent them from being disclosed in the event that the
licenses become relevant in future litigation.
In most cases, however, this strategy will not succeed. For the most part, district
courts have permitted discovery of prior licenses, even licenses protected by
confidentiality agreements, when the licenses appear relevant to the question of
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See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 2013 WL 2111217, at *2 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (Motorola
introduced as evidence of damages a license that it had negotiated with a smaller firm and that
may have been inflated for purposes of driving up Microsoft’s damages); Ericsson, Inc. v.
InterDigital Communications Corp., 418 F.3d 1217 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Nokia accused InterDigital
of artificially inflating the value of its patents to increase Nokia’s required payments); Masur,
supra note 5, at 142–43 (describing these cases).
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damages. 49 (Of course, our argument is that these licenses are almost never relevant
to the damages calculation, but courts do not yet subscribe to that view.) In some
cases, courts will issue a protective order that permits discovery of the documents
but prevents the parties and their attorneys from further disclosing the information
outside of the trial. 50 In some cases, courts will prohibit discovery of prior licenses
when the court does not believe that the licenses are highly probative of the
damages issue before the court. 51 At least one district court has also held that
ongoing or unconsummated settlement and licensing negotiations involving the
patents-in-suit are not discoverable. 52 Accordingly, in some circumstances patent
owners might be expected to delay finalizing licensing agreements until after the
conclusion of a contemporaneous trial. Nonetheless, our review of the case law
leads us to conclude that existing licenses will be discoverable in the majority of
cases.
Attempting to shield licenses with confidentiality agreements might be thought
of as one species of the greater genus of methods that patentees might use to
eliminate existing licenses as guides to damages. As we observed in the preceding
section, some patent holders might seek to render licenses useless as measures of
damages by bundling them with other goods. This is only a partial solution
however, because the licensing price still represents a floor on the value of the
patent. It is similarly unlikely that patent owners will be able to shield licenses
using confidentiality agreements, as we explain above. But it is important to note
that these methods are not mutually exclusive. A patent owner could bundle a
patent license with other goods, massage the license terms to make them appear
more lucrative than they really are, and then attach a strict confidentiality guarantee
to the agreement as well. A patentee who pursues enough of these strategies
simultaneously stands a good chance of convincing a court that the license is
incomparable or worth more than it might appear.
Patent owners also have incentives to keep licenses confidential from other
potential licensing partners, even under circumstances where divulging a license
49
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would ordinarily be in both parties’ interests. For instance, imagine that a patent
owner successfully negotiates a non-exclusive license with Firm A for $10 million.
It then opens negotiations with Firm B, which is similarly situated to Firm A, and
seeks royalties in the same amount. If courts did not use licenses to set damages, it
would be in the patent owner’s interest to divulge the existence and terms of its
license to Firm A in the course of negotiations with Firm B. The price of that
license would provide a focal point for negotiations with Firm B and might well
convince that firm to license on similar terms. 53 The information revelation would
similarly be in Firm B’s interests. It might reduce the costs of negotiation and
provide information about the activities of Firm B’s competitors. More generally,
additional information cannot possibly be harmful to Firm B.
But if courts will use licenses to calculate damages, the patent owner has a
strong incentive not to disclose its prior license to Firm B. Once Firm B observes
the $10 million license between the patent owner and Firm A, it will believe that it
likely faces only $10 million in potential liability should it lose at trial. If Firm B
believes that it has a realistic chance of prevailing at trial, it will only be willing to
license the patent for less than $10 million. (To be precise, as we noted in the
preceding part, the value of the license will be discounted by the probability that
the patent will be held invalid or not infringed at trial.) 54
On the other hand, it is possible that courts’ use of licensing-based damages
will actually encourage settlement in some cases. The reason is that once the patent
owner has licensed the patent for the first time, the owner will become more
pessimistic about the damages it will likely be awarded at trial. For instance, to
continue this example, imagine that the patent owner and Firm B agree that the
patent is 50% likely to be valid and infringed, and that in a vacuum a court would
likely award $20 million if the patent owner prevailed at trial. Under these
circumstances, the likely licensing price is $20 million × 50% = $10 million. But
if the license with Firm A exists and is likely to be divulged at trial, the patent owner
will understand that its likely damages at trial might actually be $10 million (the
license value) × 50% = $5 million. While Firm B would be willing to license for
any amount less than $10 million (its expected outcome at trial), the patent owner
would be willing to license for any amount greater than $5 million. The patent
owner thus has lower expectations than Firm B about the likely outcome at trial. 55
This opens up $5 million in bargaining space. 56 Under these conditions, the parties
are more likely to reach agreement.
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Whether courts’ misuse of licensing-based damages will encourage or
discourage settlement in any given case is therefore highly contextual. But the
more general problem with patent licenses being made confidential is that existing,
publicly known licenses represent a public good. Even if licenses are not useful in
calculating damages, they are potentially very useful as guideposts for other
licenses. One of the difficulties in arranging efficient patent licensing is that the
terms of existing licenses are often not well known, so parties struggle to find
benchmarks for the deals they wish to strike. The result is an increase in the cost
of bargaining and undoubtedly some licensing deals that do not occur because of
bargaining breakdowns.
The more licenses are made public, the greater the benefits to third parties.
Some larger firms have attempted to assemble large licensing databases as a means
of providing this type of information, but those efforts have been halting and may
also be biased by the firm’s own interests. As a general matter, it would be
beneficial if more licenses became public as a matter of course, or even as a result
of litigation. If patent owners respond to the use of licenses to calculate royalties
by attempting to hide licenses, the pool of potentially valuable licensing
information will diminish.

V. CONCLUSION: PROPOSED REFORM
To avoid the problems created by the licensing-based damages standard, we
offer a simple proposal: stop using it. Even if the litigated patent has previously
been licensed to one or more third parties, the terms of those agreements should
generally be ignored when fashioning a remedy. That is, damages should be
assigned through the same calculus employed in cases where there are no prior
agreements to use as a baseline. This ensures that remedies are not influenced by
expectations about remedies, and that licensing markets will not be distorted by
concerns that today’s dealings might undermine tomorrow’s disputes.
Because judicial reliance on prior licensing agreements is so widespread, we
anticipate that some readers will be skeptical of our proposal. At first blush, it may
appear to understate the practical complexities that distinguish patent practice from
patent scholarship. But any such criticism rests implicitly on one or more fallacious
assumptions. The first and most important fallacy, which we have already exposed
in detail, involves the presumption that prior licensing agreements are likely to
provide an apt measure of damages. We have demonstrated why, for a number of
reasons, this presumption is false. It rests on a naïve and grossly over-simplified
conception of patent licensing transactions. It also fails to appreciate the economic
complexities that distinguish them from purchases of conventional goods or
services, in particular the influence of the courts on the terms of trade. Indeed, even
if the relevant commercial circumstances are similar in a prior agreement, it does
not follow that the royalty rate negotiated in that agreement would provide a good
measure of damages in the next case. The terms of the prior agreement were likely
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distorted by the parties’ uncertainty about litigation, and such concerns have no
place shaping the successful plaintiff’s recovery.
The second fallacy is often characterized as “looking under the lamppost.”57
This involves relying on a particular system or practice not because it is likely to
be effective, but because it simple. We have demonstrated that this is precisely
what courts are doing when they rely upon previously negotiated licenses. Yet
although this approach might economize on judicial decision costs, it is thoroughly
misguided. In any normative theory of patent damages, the objective cannot simply
be to choose the standard that makes it easiest to come up with a number. Rather,
the goal should be to adopt the standard that best serves patent policy interests.
The patent courts have already made it clear that a remedial standard is not
appropriate solely on the ground that it is easy. For example, the Federal Circuit
recently held that the 25-percent “rule of thumb” is generally not an appropriate
standard for computing reasonable royalty damages. 58 Under the 25-percent rule,
courts presumed that reasonable royalties should be set at 25% of the infringer’s
revenues, absent some indication to the contrary. 59 The standard is clearly easy to
implement; it is not meaningfully different from a statutory damages rule. But
many scholars—particularly economists—derided the standard for its arbitrariness
and the courts’ apparent disinterest in considering factual issues that shed interest
on the proper measure of compensation. 60 The Federal Circuit agreed, denouncing
the rule of thumb as “fundamentally flawed” and generally inadmissible. 61 The
same logic—that the goal of a damages standard is to promote patent policy and
not simply to come up with a number—suggests that the licensing-based damages
standard is not likely to be effective simply because it is practicable. And as we
have shown above, the use of an improper standard can create real social costs.
The third fallacy, which is similar, is that a damages standard based on existing
licenses is likely to elicit better results because it is more predictable—even if it is
wrong. In other words, proponents of this fallacy might argue that a bright-line rule
is superior to a standard, even if the rule has a known bias. It is of course true that
calculating damages based upon the value of the underlying technology—rather
than using existing licenses—will necessarily require some speculation and involve
some degree of uncertainty. 62 Under normal circumstances, this might be a
57
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disadvantage given that the goal is to encourage licensing. Typically, the greater
the level of certainty over likely outcomes at trial, the greater the likelihood that the
parties will be able to reach a settlement—here, a license. 63 But that is not the case
for patent licenses. In this context, certainty about how courts will use licenses—
that is, certainty that they will use existing licenses to calculate damages—is
precisely what deters patent holders from licensing. The more certain an owner is
that a court will use a license to calculate future damages, the greater the incentive
for the patent owner to obscure the value of the license or refrain from licensing
entirely, for all the reasons we detail above.
The uncertainty involved in calculating damages on the basis of the value of the
underlying technology—rather than using existing licenses as a guide—is by no
means a feature. However, so long as damages are not biased on average, patentees
will believe that they are likely to receive fair compensation in expectation. Patent
owners and putative infringers will have the proper incentives. If damages
calculations based upon the value of the technology do turn out to be biased—that
is, if they under-or over-compensate on average—then certainly courts should
attempt to reform their practices. But it is undeniably better to tolerate some
uncertainty in calculating damages than to rely upon a methodology that will
reliably generate wrong answers.
The fourth and final fallacy, which is implicit in some potential critiques of our
proposal, is that a patent damages standard that relies upon prior licenses will not
undermine patent licensing so long as successful plaintiffs appear to be adequately
compensated in most final judgments. This type of argument proceeds as follows:
among the set of cases that are litigated to judgment, successful plaintiffs seem to
get adequate compensation in most cases. Therefore, licensing markets will operate
efficiently, because potential-infringers know that they will have to provide
sufficient compensation if they refuse to pay an adequate price for a license.
This argument is beset by a selection bias problem, however. It may be that
there is actually much less licensing going on, because patentees—wanting to keep
their recovery prospects as strong as possible—are refusing to license at anything
less than a high royalty rate, even though they could reach additional mutually
beneficial agreements on more modest terms.
As we have already noted, one possible exception to our proposal is a patent
that has been widely licensed on common terms to many different licensees, as with
patents subject to a RAND commitment. 64 But the standard will be inapt even in
these cases if the established royalty was materially affected by pre-litigation
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uncertainty about whether the patent would be held valid and infringed. 65 Thus, if
the court uses the established royalty as the measure of damages, it allows
expectations about the plaintiff’s litigation prospects to influence the remedy.
Patent licensing markets are complex, and there are many variables that
determine which terms are mutually beneficial in a particular licensing relationship.
The optimal royalty might be higher in one exchange and lower in another. As a
consequence, economic efficiency requires that patent holders vary licensing terms
among different transactions so as to maximize the number of mutually beneficial
deals that are reached. But this paper demonstrates that the courts unwittingly
discourage this kind of efficient discrimination when they base patent damages on
prior licensing agreements involving the litigated patent. This tethers patent
holders to the terms of their private dealings, leaving them wary of accepting
anything less than a high royalty rate, even if this means foregoing many mutually
beneficial licensing opportunities that could be reached only on more modest terms.
While administratively convenient in the small number of cases that are actually
litigated to judgment, it creates problems in virtually all patent licensing, and thus
substantially undermines the efficient commercialization of patented inventions.
Eradicating the licensing-based damages standard would benefit not only patent
holders, but also prospective licensees and their consumers.

65
As noted earlier in Section X, since the parties have litigated the dispute to judgment, it is probably
safe to infer that there was significant pre-judgment uncertainty. One might counter that the present
dispute may have involved some uncertain elements that were not present in the prior agreement.
For example, perhaps the defendant’s product is different from those of nonparty licensees, and the
infringement question is less obvious here. But, of course, such distinctions cast doubt on the
comparability of the prior licensing deals.
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